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11 Introduction
While there is limited evidence that government intervention in markets may improve
welfare, there is also convincing evidence that government institutions are subject to
political capture. However, less is known about the economic and political implications of
capture: How does capture work? What explains the temporal and cross-sectional variation
in capture? Is it costly?
This paper presents evidence that government-owned banks in India serve the electoral
interests of politicians, and analyzes how resources are strategically distributed. The
identi￿cation strategy is straightforward: the Indian constitution requires states to hold
elections every ￿ve years. I therefore compare lending in years prior to scheduled elections,
to lending in o⁄-election years.1 To test for cross-sectional capture, I use state elections
data to measure whether credit levels in a district vary with amount of electoral support
for the incumbent party. Finally, combining these two theories, I determine whether the
observed cross-sectional relationships vary with the electoral cycle.
I ￿nd compelling evidence of political capture. Agricultural credit lent by public
banks is substantially higher in election years. More loans are made in districts in which
the ruling state party had a narrow margin of victory (or a narrow loss), than in less
competitive districts. This targeting is not observed in o⁄-election years, or in private
bank lending. Political interference is costly: defaults increase around election time.
Moreover, agricultural lending booms do not a⁄ect agricultural investment or output.
This paper contributes to three literatures. A relatively recent body of empirical work
evaluates how government ownership of banks a⁄ects ￿nancial development and economic
growth. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2002) demon-
strate that government ownership of banks is prevalent in both developing and developed
countries, and is associated with slower ￿nancial development and slower growth. Cole
(2007) exploits a natural experiment to measure the e⁄ects of bank nationalization in
1As in most parliamentary democracies, elections may be called early. As described in section 3.2, I
use the ￿ve-year constitutional schedule as an instrument for actual elections.
2India. I ￿nd that government ownership leads to lower interest rates, lower quality ￿nan-
cial intermediation, and that nationalization slowed ￿nancial development and economic
growth.
Two other papers use loan-level data sets to explore the behavior of public sector
banks. Paola Sapienza (2004) ￿nds that Italian public banks charge interest rates ap-
proximately 50 basis points lower than private banks, and ￿nds a correlation between
electoral results and interest rates charged by politically-a¢ liated banks. Asim I. Khwaja
and Atif R. Mian (2005) ￿nd that Pakistani politicians enrich themselves and their ￿rms
by borrowing from government banks and defaulting on loans.
The second literature is on political budget cycles. Relative to the existing literature,
this paper provides a particularly clean test of cyclical manipulation. First, because Indian
state elections are not synchronized, I can exploit within-India variation in the relation-
ship between electoral cycles and credit, and thus rule out macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
as a possible explanation for cycles. Second, the interpretation of observed cycles for
agricultural credit is particularly clear. Agricultural lending in India is ostensibly entirely
unrelated to the political process: banks are corporate entities, with an o¢ cial mandate
to operate in a commercial manner. Absent political considerations, banks should not
exhibit electoral cycles.
Two recent papers are related to this present work. A paper by Serdar Dinc (2005)
examines lending of public and private sector banks in a large cross-country sample. Dinc
￿nds that in election years, the growth rate of credit from private banks slows, while
the growth rate of government-owned banks remains constant. Marianne Bertrand et.
al. (2004) study ￿rm behavior in France, and ￿nd that ￿rms with politically connected
CEOs strategically hire and ￿re around election years: this e⁄ect is strongest in politically
competive regions.
Finally, this paper provides a compelling test of theories of politically-motivated redis-
tribution. Compared to previous studies, this paper o⁄ers several bene￿ts. A signi￿cantly
larger sample, with 412 districts over eight years, with 32 elections, allows district ￿xed-
3e⁄ects. We observe decisions made by over 45,000 public sector banks, disbursing millions
of loans. Credit varies continuosly, adjusts quickly, and repayment rates are observable.
The combination of cross-sectional and time-series analysis represents a signi￿cant
methodological improvement in tools used to identify electorally-motivated redistribution.
There are several reasons, unrelated to tactical distribution, that could explain a cross-
sectional relationship between electoral outcomes and redistribution. There are other
explanations, again unrelated to political goals, that could explain time-series variation.
However, none of these reasons could explain why we would observe a cross-sectional
relationship in election years, but not in o⁄-election years.
A second substantive contribution of this paper is to identify the costs of tactical
redistribution. Perhaps the threat of upcoming elections simply causes politicians to
behave more closely in line with the public interest. For example, Akhmed Akhmedov
and Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya (2004) demonstrate that politicians pay back wages prior
to elections. If political intervention simply shifts resources from one group to another,
but both groups use resources e¢ ciently, then reducing the scope for intervention has
implications for equity, but not aggregate output. On the other hand, if the targeted
credit is not productively employed, the costs of redistribution may be substantial. A
similar question can be asked about cycles: are observed spending booms squandered
on projects with little return, or are the funds put to good use? The answers to these
questions are essential to understanding whether tactical redistribution is merely a minor
cost of the democratic process, or is so costly that it may be desirable to substantially
circumscribe the latitude of governments to intervene in the economy.
I note two limitations to the data. First, the time panel of only 8 years is shorter
than would be ideal for estimating political cycles. This drawback is mitigated to some
extent by the fact that we observe elections in 19 states, which are not synchronized with
each other. Second, the credit data are observed at the administrative district level, while
electoral competition occurs at the smaller, constituency, level.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I brie￿ y describe the context of
4banking and politics in India, including the mechanisms by which politicians may in￿ uence
banks. In Section 2.3, I discuss competing theories of political redistribution, and their
testable predictions. Section 3 develops the empirical strategy and presents the main
results of political capture. In Section 4, I establish that these political manipulations
are socially costly: increases in government agricultural credit do not a⁄ect agricultural
output. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Indian Context and Redistribution
2.1 Banking in India
Government planning and regulation were key components of India￿ s post-independence
development strategy, particularly in the ￿nancial sector. Three government policies stand
out. First and foremost, the government nationalized many private banks in 1969 and
1980. Second, both public and private banks were required to lend at least a certain
percentage of credit to agriculture and small-scale industry. Finally, a branch expansion
policy obliged banks to open four branches in unbanked locations for every branch opened
in a location in which a bank was already present.
The three policies had a substantial e⁄ect on India￿ s banking system, making it an
attractive target for government capture. The branch expansion policy increased the
scope of banking in India to a scale unique to its level of development: in 2000, India
had over 60,000 bank branches (both public and private), located in every district across
the country. Nationalized banks increased the availability of credit in rural areas and
for agricultural uses. Robin Burgess and Rohini Pande (2005), and Burgess, Pande,
and Grace Wong (2005) show that the redistributive nature of branch expansion led to a
substantial decline in poverty among India￿ s rural population. However, these government
policies also made public sector banks very attractive targets for capture: public banks did
not face hard budget constraints, were subject to political regulation, and were present
throughout India.
5Formal ￿nancial institutions in India date back to the 18th century, with the founding
of the English Agency House in Calcutta and Bombay. Over the next century, presidency
banks, as well as foreign and private banks entered the Indian market. In 1935, the
presidency banks were merged to form the Imperial Bank of India, later renamed the State
Bank of India, which became and continues to be the largest bank in India. Following
independence, both public and private banks grew rapidly. By March 1, 1969, there were
almost 8,000 bank branches, approximately 31% of which were in government hands. In
April of 1969, the central government, to increase its control over the banking system,
nationalized the 14 largest private banks with deposits greater than Rs. 500 million.
These banks comprised 54% of the bank branches in India at the time. The rationale for
nationalization was given in the 1969 Bank Nationalization Act: ￿an institution such as
the banking system which touches and should touch the lives of millions has to be inspired
by a larger social purpose and has to subserve national priorities and objectives such as
rapid growth in agriculture, small industry and exports, raising of employment levels,
encouragement of new entrepreneurs and the development of the backward areas. For this
purpose it is necessary for the Government to take direct responsibility for extension and
diversi￿cation of the banking services and for the working of a substantial part of the
banking system.￿ 2
In 1980, the government of India undertook a second wave of nationalization, by
taking control of all banks whose deposits were greater than Rs. 2 billion. Nationalized
banks remained corporate entities, retaining most of their sta⁄, with the exception of
the board of directors, who were replaced by appointees of the government. The political
appointments included representatives from the government, industry, agriculture, as well
as the public.
2Quoted in Burgess and Pande (2005).
62.2 Politics in India
India has a federal structure, with both national and state assemblies. The constitution
requires that elections for both the state and national parliaments be held at ￿ve year
intervals, though elections are not synchronized. Most notably, the central government
can declare ￿President￿ s rule￿and dissolve a state legislature, leading to early elections.
Although this is meant to occur only if the state government is nonfunctional, state
governments have been dismissed for political reasons as well. Additionally, as in other
parliamentary systems, if the ruling coalition loses control, early elections are held.
The Indian National Congress Party dominated both state and national politics from
the time of independence until the late 1980s. Since then, states have witnessed vibrant
political competition. In the period I study, 1992-1999, a dozen distinct parties were in
power, at various times in various states. The sample I use contains 32 separate elections
in 19 states. These elections are generally competitive: over half of the elections were
decided by margins of less than 10 percent.
State governments have broad powers to tax and spend, as well as regulate legal and
economic institutions. While members of state legislative assemblies (￿MLAs￿ ) lack for-
mal authority over banks, there are several means by which they can in￿ uence them. First
and foremost, the ruling state government appoints members of the ￿State Level Bankers
Committees,￿which coordinate lending policies and practices in each state, with a par-
ticular focus on lending to the ￿priority sector￿(agriculture and small-scale industry).3
The committees meet quarterly, and are composed of State Government politicians and
appointees, public and private sector banks, and the Reserve Bank of India. The com-
mittees often set explicit targets for levels of credit to be delivered. Their membership
typically turns over when the state government changes. The committees are the most
direct channel for political in￿ uence, and for this reason I focus on state, rather than
federal elections.
3See for example, ￿Master Circular Priority Sector Lendings,￿RPCD No. SP. BC. 37, dated Sept.
29, 2004, Reserve Bank of India.
7Governments also directly in￿ uence banks. John Harriss (1991) writes of villagers in
India in 1980: ￿It is widely believed by people in villages that if they hold out long enough,
debts incurred as a result of a failure to repay these loans will eventually be cancelled, as
they have been in the past (as they were, for example, after the state legislative assembly
elections in 1980.￿ 4 A former governor of the Reserve Bank of India has lamented that the
appointment of board members to public sector banks is ￿highly politicized,￿and that
board members are often involved in credit decisions.5 Nor are state politicians hesitant
to promise loans during elections. For example, the Financial Express reports:
Two main contenders in the Rajasthan assembly elections...are talking about
economic well-being in order to muster votes. No wonder then that easier
bank loans for farmers, remunerative earnings from agriculture on a bumper
crop as well as uninterrupted power supply appear foremost in the manifestoes
of both the parties.6
Dale W. Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. von Pischke (1984) describe why
agricultural credit is a particularly attractive lever for politicians to manipulate: the
bene￿ts are transparent, while the costs are not. This makes it hard for opposition
politicians to criticize e⁄orts by those in power.
Focusing on agricultural credit makes sense within the context of India, since the
majority of the Indian population is dependent on the agricultural sector. Agricultural
lending plays a substantial role in the Indian economy: in 1996, there were approximately
20 million agricultural loans, with an average size of Rs. 11,910 (ca. $220). Although
agricultural credit comprises only about 17% of the value of public sector banks￿loan
portfolios, its importance in the share of loans is large: approximately 40% of loans made
by public sector banks are agricultural loans.7
4p. 79, cited in Timothy J. Besley (1995), p. 2173.
5Times of India, June 2, 1999.
6Financial Express, November 30, 2003.
7￿Basic Statistical Returns,￿Table 1.9, Reserve Bank of India, 1996.
8The amount of agricultural credit lent by banks is orders of magnitude larger than the
amount of money spent on campaigns in India. Each legislative constituency receives, on
average, about Rs. 50 - 80 million in credit ($1-$1.6 million). While campaign spending
is di¢ cult to measure (campaign spending limits are di¢ cult to enforce, and money spent
without authorization of a candidate does not count against the sum), the level of legal
campaign limits is informative: between 1992 and 1999, the legal limit ranged from Rs.
50,000 (approximately US $1,000) to Rs. 700,000 (ca. $14,000), or less than 1% of the
amount of agricultural credit. (E. Sridharan (1999)).
2.3 Theories and Tests of Redistribution
2.3.1 Political Cycles
Theories of political cycles predict politicians manipulate policy tools around elections,
either to fool voters or to signal their ability. A large literature tests for cycles in ￿scal
and monteary variables. Min Shi and Jakob Svensson (2006), review the literature and
o⁄er new evidence, ￿nding that ￿scal cycles are more pronounced in countries in which
institutions protecting property rights are weaker and voters are less informed.
The robust relationship between elections and budget de￿cits need not, however, imply
that politicians behave opportunistically. Lower tax collection or increased spending
could di⁄er systematically prior to elections for other reasons. Spending increases may be
attributable to the fact that politicians, who seek to implement programs, learn on the
job. On average, a year just before an election will have politicians with a longer tenure
than a year just after an election, since the politician will have served, at a minimum,
almost an entire term in o¢ ce.
These concerns are less applicable when studying agricultural credit. Political goals
should not a⁄ect the amount of agricultural credit issued by public sector banks. The
most signi￿cant factor in￿ uencing farmers￿agricultural credit needs is almost certainly
weather, which is inarguably out of the politicians￿control. Second, because I focus on
9state elections, the possibility that state-speci￿c agricultural credit moves in response to
national economic shocks (such as interest rates or exchange rate adjustments) can be
ruled out.
Of course, if there are large cycles in state government spending in India, agricultural
credit could covary with elections for reasons unrelated to government interference in
banks. Stuti Khemani (2004) tests for political budget cycles in Indian states. She ￿nds
no evidence of political cycles in overall spending or de￿cits. She does ￿nd evidence of
small decreases in excise tax revenue, as well as evidence of other minor ￿scal manipulation
prior to Indian state elections.
2.3.2 Politically Motivated Redistribution
The literature on targeted redistribution distinguishes betwen patronage, which invovles
rewarding supporters, and tactical redistribution, which is made to acheive electoral or
political goals (Avinash K. Dixit and John B. Londregan, 1996, Snyder, 1989, and Gary W.
Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, 1986). ￿Patronage￿invovles awarding areas in which
the ruling party enjoys more support a disproportionate amount of resources, irrespective
of electoral goals. ￿Tactical redistribution￿predicts resource allocation will follow one
of two patterns: resources will be targeted towards ￿swing￿districts, or politicians will
disproportionately reward their supporters.
Empirically distinguishing between the theoretical models is di¢ cult for several rea-
sons. Data on purely tactical spending is rarely readily available, and such spending
often does not vary much over time and space. Sample sizes may be small,8 and without
8Matz Dahlberg and Eva Johanssen (2002) study a grant project in Sweden, in which the incumbent
government enjoyed control over which constituencies received the grant. They ￿nd strong evidence that
money was targeted to districts in which swing voters were located. In contrast, Anne Case (2001),
examining an income redistribution program in Albania, ￿nds that the program favored areas in which
the majority party enjoyed greater support. Finally, Edward Miguel and Farhan Zaidi (2003) examine
the relationship between political support and educational spending in Ghana, and ￿nd no evidence of
targeted distribution of educational spending at the parliamentary level. The sample sizes are 115, 47,
10a panel dimension, it is di¢ cult to rule out the possibility that omitted variables, such as
per-capita income, drive results.
This work overcomes these problems: the sample size is large, 412 districts and 32
election cycles, allowing for district ￿xed-e⁄ects. Most importantly, the cross-sectional
and time-series component taken together allow for a much more powerful test of both
political cycles and tactical redistribution. The political budget cycle literature predicts
that politicians and voters care more about allocation of resources prior to elections,
than in other periods. Thus, observed distortions, such as patronage, or targeting swing
districts, should be larger during election years than non-election years. This test thus has
the power to distinguish between models of patronage unrelated to electoral incentives,
and models that predict a positive relationship between support and redistribution simply
as a result of electoral incentives: the former would not vary with the electoral cycle,
while the latter would. While either cycles or cross-sectional variation could be caused by
reasons other than electorally-motivated manipulation, it is very unlikely that the cross-
sectional relationships would change over the electoral cycle for any reason other than
tactical redistribution.
3 Evidence
I begin with a brief description of the data (details are available in the data appendix),
and then develop the empirical strategies, and present results for political lending cycles
and tactical targeting of credit.
3.1 Data
Unless otherwise indicated, the unit of observation in this section is the administrative
district, roughly similar to a U.S. county. The data, collected by the Reserve Bank of
India (￿Basic Statistical Returns￿ ) are aggregated at the district level, and published in
and 199 units, respectively.
11￿Banking Statistics.￿ This aggregation is based on every loan made by every bank in
India.9
The main outcome of interest is credit, which is available only from 1992-1999, at the
district level, for 412 districts in 19 states, yielding 3,296 observations. The credit data
are recorded as of the end of the Indian ￿scal year, March 31. Table 1 gives summary
statistics. Election data for state legislative elections are available at the constituency level
from 1985-1999. These data, from the Election Commission of India, include the identity,
party a¢ liation, and share of votes won, for every candidate in a state election from 1985
to 1999. Electoral constituencies are typically smaller than districts: the median district
has nine electoral constituencies.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
I measure political outcomes in a district by using the margin of victory of the in-
cumbent ruling party.10 All members of parties aligned with the majority coalition were
coded as ￿majority.￿ 11 Because credit data are observed at the district level, vote shares
are also aggregated to the district level. I use as a measure of ruling party strength, Mdt;
the average margin of victory of the state ruling party in a district. The median district
has 9 legislative assembly constituencies.
There are two important limitations to this dataset. First, the time panel is relatively
short (8 years), which is not ideal for estimating a ￿ve-year cycle. I focus on standard
9Banks were allowed to report loans smaller than Rs. 25,000 (ca. $625) in an aggregated fashion until
1999, at which point loans below Rs. 200,000 (ca. $5,000) were reported as aggregates.
10If the majority party did not ￿eld a candidate, I de￿ne the margin of victory for the majority party
to be the negative of the vote share of the winning candidate. If the majority party candidate ran
unopposed, I de￿ne the margin of victory to be 100. If no party held a majority of the seats, the ruling
coalition is identi￿ed from new reports in the Times of India.
11The theoretical models of redistribution derived below were motivated by a two-party system. While
India has many parties, I am careful to code all members of the ruling coalition as Majority Party.
Moreover, Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman (1998) document that while India often had more
than two parties at the national level, in local elections, the political system closely resembled a two-
party system.
12panel estimation, using log credit as the dependent variable. A large share of agricultural
credit is short-term loans, with maturation of less than a year. The median and mean
rate of real agricultural credit growth for public banks is zero over the period studied. In
a previous version of this paper (available on request) I show that the results are robust
to estimation in changes, as well as to estimation in a dynamic panel setting, using the
GMM technique developed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991). I discuss
this concern in greater detail in the next section.
Second, the data are observed at the administrative district level, while electoral con-
stituencies are typically smaller than a district. Di⁄erent methods of aggreation (described
below) yield very similar results. Indeed, the district level may be the appropriate level
of analysis, as the political committees that in￿ uence credit meet at the district level.
Moreover, credit itself may cross constituency boundaries: the district of Mumbai has 34
constituencies and 1,581 bank branches.12
3.2 Political Cycle Results
3.2.1 The Amount of Credit
The simplest approach to test for temporal manipulation is to compare the amount of
credit issued in election years to the amount issued in non-election years. I include district
￿xed-e⁄ects to control for time-invariant characteristics in a district that a⁄ect credit. The
Reserve Bank of India divides states in India into six regions. Region-year ￿xed e⁄ects
(￿rt) control for macroeconomic ￿ uctuations.13 Finally, I include the average rainfall in
12Matching credit data to constituencies would require substantial e⁄ort. However, identifying credit
￿leakages￿ outside the targeted constituency would allow a test of the electoral impact of additional
credit, using a methodology similar to Steven Levitt and James M. Snyder (1997). I leave this for future
research.
13All results presented here are robust to using year, rather than region*year ￿xed e⁄ects. State*year
￿xed e⁄ects would of course be collinear with the election variables. Results are also robust to including
or excluding rainfall, which is the only time-varying variable available at the district level. Finally, results
are robust to including a district-speci￿c linear time trend.
13the previous 12 months in district t (Raindt). Formally, I regress:
ydt = ￿d + ￿rt + ￿Raindt + ￿Est + "dt (1)
where ydt is the log level of credit, ￿d is a district ￿xed-e⁄ect, and Est is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the state s had an election in year t. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-year level.14
While the constitution mandates elections be held every ￿ve years, the timing is subject
to some slippage: in the sample, one fourth of elections (10 out of 37) occur before they are
scheduled. The typical cause of an early election is a change in the coalition leadership. If
parties in power call early elections when the state economy is doing particularly well, one
may observe a spurious correlation between credit and election years. Following Khemani
(2004), I use as an instrument for election year a dummy, S0
st; for whether ￿ve years have
passed since the previous election. (The superscript on Sst denotes the number of years
until the next scheduled election). The ￿rst stage is thus:
Est = ￿d + ￿rt + ￿Raindt + ￿
0S
0
st + "dt (2)
Because elections are required after four years without an election, S0
st is a powerful
predictor of elections. In the ￿rst-stage regression, the estimated coe¢ cient is 0.99, with
a standard error of 0.01. This ￿rst stage explains 86% of the variation in election years,
because early elections are not common.15
An alternative IV strategy would only use information on election timing prior to 1990
to predict subsequent elections. Denoting ts the ￿rst election after 1985 in state s, this
instrument assigns elections to years ts;ts + 5; ts + 10; and ts + 15: One disadvantage
14Results are robust to clustering by state. Serial correlation is less of a concern here than in a
standard di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence setting, because the election cycle dummies exhibit only weakly negative
serial correlation.
15The results reported here are robust to an alternative instrument which uses information on elections
only prior to 1990. Denoting ts the ￿rst election after 1985 in state s, this instrument assigns elections
to years ts;ts + 5; ts + 10; and ts + 15: However, because the cycle results resemble a sine function, this
approach provides relatively less power. I therefore ￿reset￿the instrument after an early election.
14of this approach is that, because the cycle results resemble a sine function, it provides
substantially less power.16
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Do elections a⁄ect credit? Table 2 gives the results from OLS, reduced form, and
instrumental variable regressions. I focus initially on aggregate credit and agricultural
credit. For agricultural credit, there is clear evidence of electoral manipulation: both the
IV and reduced form estimates indicate that the lending by public sector banks is about 6
percentage points higher in election years than non-election years.17 This e⁄ect of elections
on agricultural credit is not due to aggregate annual shocks, which would be absorbed
by the region-year ￿xed e⁄ect, nor can it be attributed to budgetary manipulation, since
state governments did not spend more in election years.18 Nor is there any systematic
relationship, in the OLS, reduced form or IV, between elections and non-agricultural
credit. The IV and OLS estimates are relatively similar, suggesting that the endogeneity
of election years should not be a large concern. The alternative IV strategy, presented
in Panel D, also ￿nds a signi￿cant increase in agricultural credit in election years for all
banks and for public banks, though no increase for total credit.
Interestingly, no relationship between credit and elections is observed for private banks:
the point estimate on the scheduled election dummy for private agricultural lending is
-0.02, and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Because private sector banks are
smaller, operate in substantially fewer districts, and have more volatile agricultural lend-
ing, their usefulness as a control group is limited, and the con￿dence intervals around the
point estimates are relatively large.
Table 3 expands these results by tracing out how lending comoves with the entire
16A referee suggested I compare the fraction of elections that occurs o⁄-cycle for the years prior to,
and following the start of my sample. I do so, and ￿nd no di⁄erence.
17Because the left hand side variable is in logs, the coe¢ cients may be interpreted approximately as
percentage e⁄ects.
18Khemani (2004) demonstrates that state budgets do not exhibit signicant cycles in the amount of
money spent.
15election cycle. This requires a straightforward extension of equations 1 and 2. De￿ne
S
￿k
st ; k=0,...4, as dummies which take the value 1 if the next scheduled election is in k
years for state s at time t. For example, if Karnataka had elections in 1991, 1993, and
1998, S
￿4
st would be 1 for years 1992 and 1994, and 1999, while S
￿3
st would be 1 in 1995
only, and S0
st would be 1 for year 1998 only.
The following regression gives the reduced-form estimate of the entire lending cycle:








st + "dt (3)
The IV equivalent would use the S
￿k
st as instruments for E
￿k
st , where E
￿k
st is de￿ned as
the actual number of years until the next election. (Because the IV and reduced form
estimates are virtually identical, throughout the rest of the paper, only the latter are
reported). Each row in Table 3 represents a separate regression. Panel A gives sectoral
credit issued by all banks, Panel B by public banks, and Panel C by private banks.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The results indicate that agricultural credit issued by public banks is lower in the
years that were four, three, and two years prior to an election than in the years before
an election or election years. The di⁄erence, of up to 8 percentage points, is substantial
given that the average growth rate of real agricultural credit issued by public sector banks
was 0.5% over the sample period. Cycles are not observed in non-agricultural lending,
though the point estimates are negative and consistent with a smaller cycle.
While cycles are not observed for private banks, the standard errors on the cycle
dummies are much larger than those for public sector banks, and cycles in private banks
cannot be ruled out. Could it be that increased public sector lending simply crowds out
private sector lending in election years, while private banks pick up the lending slack
in the years between elections? The relative size of the two bank groups rules out this
possibility: private sector banks issue only approximately ten percent of credit in India,
and are underweight in their exposure to agricultural credit. Thus, an eight percent
decline in the amount of agricultural credit issued by public sector banks would have to
be met by an almost doubling of the amount of agricultural credit issued by private sector
16banks, an amount far beyond the con￿dence interval of the estimated size of a cycle for
private banks. Thus, while public bank lending may crowd out private credit, there is
still a large aggregate e⁄ect.
3.2.2 The Type of Credit
Table 4 investigates how the nature of lending varies over the political cycle. I ￿rst
examine loan volume. An increase in lending could be due to changes on the extensive
margin, with banks lending to additional borrowers, as well as the intensive margin,
with banks making larger loans. I ￿nd evidence for both: the o⁄-election cycle dummies
are negative for both the average agricultural loan size, and the number of agricultural
loans. Their magnitude is consistent with the magnitude e⁄ects found in Table 3 (credit
volume=number of loans * average size), though because the size of the decline of each
component is mechanically smaller than the decline in volume, the components are not
always statistically distinguishable from zero. There is no systematic variation in loan
size or number of loans for private banks.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Interest rates from public banks do not change with the increase in lending. Interest-
ingly, however, private sector banks seem to charge higher rates for agricultural loans in
non-election years, with a di⁄erence of up to 50 basis points between peak and trough
years. It may well be that, in election years, private banks lower the interest rate they
charge for agricultural loans in order to attract borrowers who might otherwise ￿nd credit
on more favorable terms from public sector banks.
3.2.3 Political Cycles and Loan Default
What are the real e⁄ects of this observed distortion? I begin this section by investigating
whether the electoral cycle a⁄ects the rate of default among agricultural loans. I then test
directly whether more government credit from public banks leads to greater agricultural
output.
17In a study on Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) document that loans made by public
sector banks to ￿rms controlled by politicians are much more likely to end up in default.
In this section, we demonstrate that electoral considerations a⁄ect loan default for loans
made to the general public as well.
I estimate the reduced form relationship between agricultural credit default rates and
the electoral cycle. I use three measures of default rate: the log volume of late credit, the
share of loans late, and the share of credit late. Loans are coded as late if they are past
due by at least six months. Most agricultural loans are short-term credit, meant to be
repaid after the growing season. (Summary statistics are given in Table 1). The results,
from equation 3 are presented in Table 5. There is a large cycle in the volume of late
agricultural loans: the amount increases 16% in government-owned banks in scheduled
election years relative to the trough two years prior to the election. Credit is increasing in
election years, so one might naturally expect the volume of bad loans to increase (Panel
B), especially if the marginal borrower is higher-risk during a credit expansion. However,
the size of the cycle in default is much larger than the credit cycle: the di⁄erence from
peak to trough in credit volume is 8%, but it is 15% for the volume of loans in default. It
is unlikely that this eight percent expansion in credit volume (particularly given that the
number of loans increases less than the volume) would lead to such high default, if loans
were made purely on a commercial basis.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The fact that the share of agricultural credit marked late from public banks drops
following the election year may seem initially puzzling: these are presumably the years
in which electoral loans come to maturation. However, this is likely explained by the
fact that politicians induce banks to write o⁄loans following elections. The popular press
contains many reports of these political promises. For example, in 1987 the Chief Minister
of Haryana promised to write o⁄ all agricultural loans under 20,000 during the election
campaign. Following his victory, he held his promise. (Shalendra D. Sharma, 1999, p.
18207). The evidence in Table 5 supports the view that this behavior is common in India.19
We explore this further in section 3.3.1.
3.2.4 What Determines the Size of the Cycle?
What determines the size of the lending cycles? In this subsection, I consider how the size
of the electoral cycle varies with ￿xed district characteristics. One natural line of inquiry
is to examine whether the quality of corporate governance of the banks in a district is
relevant: banks with professional managers, or managers who are able to resist political
pressure, may be less likely to engage in costly cycles. However, no measure of the quality
of corporate governance of banks is available. Instead, I use the share of loans late in a
given district in 1992 as a proxy.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
I estimate slightly modi￿ed versions of equations 1 and 2: in addition to the dummy for
scheduled election year (S0
dt), I include an interaction term between the (time-invariant)
district characteristic Cd and the election indicator.20 The main e⁄ect of the district
characteristic is of course captured in the district ￿xed e⁄ect:
ydt = ￿d + ￿rt + ￿Raindt + ￿Sst + ￿(Edt ￿ Cd) + "dt (4)
Table 6 presents the results. The ￿rst row gives the main election e⁄ect without the
interaction. The regressions presented in columns (1) and (2) give the results for public
banks, while those in (3) and (4) give them for private banks. The second two rows
interact election with measures of loan default. The point estimates on ￿ are negative, but
insigni￿cant. The mean value of Share of Agricultural Loans Late is 0.1, with a standard
deviation of 0.1. Thus, taking the point estimates at face value, comparing a district with
19The data do not indicate when the loans were made, so it is not possible to distinguish at which
point in the election cycle defaulting loans were issued.
20I take district characteristics at the beginning of the time period: there is no time variation in these.
The share of loans late is calculated as of 1992, while the population variables are from the 1991 census.
1930% default to one with 10% default, the size of the cycle would be approximately two
percentage points smaller in the region with higher default rates.
Most theories of political cycles require asymmetric information between politicians
and voters. Shi and Svensson (2006) present a model in which the share of informed
voters a⁄ects the size of the observed election cycles: since informed voters are not fooled
by manipulation, the greater the share of informed voters, the smaller the incentive to
manipulate. The authors test this ￿nding in the cross-country setting, and ￿nd strong
support for it. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) ￿nd similar results in Russia: regions
with higher levels of voter awareness, greater education, and more urbanization experience
smaller cycles. No measures of voter awareness are available in India at the district level,
however, I consider whether the latter two are correlated with the size of the cycle.
The share of the population that is rural strongly a⁄ects the size of the cycle. Note
that this is not a mechanical e⁄ect driven by the fact that the level of agricultural credit
is greater in districts with greater rural populations. The dependent variable, agricultural
credit, is in logs, so the coe¢ cients represent percentage increases over non-election levels.
The average rural population share is 0.78, with a standard deviation of 0.15. Thus, a
one standard deviation increase in the share of rural population increases the size of the
cycle by approximately two percentage points.
I also ￿nd results consistent with previous ￿ndings on education. Cycles are signi￿-
cantly smaller in areas with higher literacy, and in which a higher share of the population
has graduated from primary school. These same results hold for other schooling levels.
Results are generally similar if actual, rather than scheduled, election year is used.
A recent paper (Khemani, 2007) suggests that central government budget allocations
are subject to political in￿ uence: the government transfers greater resources to politically
important states. However, I do not ￿nd evidence that the size of the lending cycle
depends on whether the state government is a¢ liated with the central ruling party.
203.3 How are Resources Targeted?
In this subsection, I examine whether agricultural credit varies with the margin of victory
enjoyed by the current ruling party in each district. Credit is observed at the district
level, and as there are multiple constituencies within a district, it is necessary to aggre-
gate. As a ￿rst measure, I de￿ne Mdt as the average (constituency-weighted) margin of
victory of the incumbent ruling party. Aggregation at the district level may in fact be the
most reasonable speci￿cation, as political in￿ uence occurs at the level of the district-level
meetings. I assign to Mdt the margin of victory of the ruling party in the years immedi-
ately following the election. For years just prior to the election, the ideal measure would
be poll data indicating the expected margin of victory. Lacking that, I use the realized
margin of victory of the ruling party in the upcoming election for Mdt in the two years
prior to the election.21
Since section 3.2 demonstrated that credit varies over the election cycle, I continue
to include the indicators for election cycle, S
￿k
st : The simplest model of patronage would
posit that greater support for the majority party leads to increased credit. The most
straightforward test for this would be to simply include the average margin of victory of
the ruling party in the previous election, Mdt in equation 3. A positive coe¢ cient would
provide suggestive evidence that areas with more support receive more credit. (Unless
explicitly noted, I continue to include ￿rt and Raindt but suppress them in the exposition
for notational simplicity). The regression is thus the following:








st + "dt (5)
The estimates are reported in column (2) of Table 7. For public sector banks, the coe¢ -
21In scheduled election years, the margin of victory of the incumbent party is used. The margin of
victory of the majority party is used in scheduled election years -4 and -3. In scheduled election years -2
and -1, the ruling party is again de￿ned as the incumbent party, but their margin of victory is assigned
using the upcoming election results. To the extent that politicians know in which districts the race will
be competitive, this should be a valid proxy for expected competitiveness.
21cient on Mdt is relatively precisely estimated at zero. (The standard deviation of Mdt is
approximately 15 percentage points). This provides strong evidence against a model of
constant patronage, in which the majority party rewards districts that voted for it while
punishing districts that voted for the opposition: a model of patronage would imply a
positive ￿; something the estimate can rule out.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The model in equation 5 is very restrictive: it would not detect tactical distribution
towards swing districts, since it imposes a monotonic relationship across all levels of
support. If politicians target lending to ￿marginal￿districts, then
@ydt
@Mdt < 0 when Mdt < 0;
and
@ydt
@Mdt > 0 when Mdt > 0: I therefore de￿ne M
+
dt ￿ Mdt￿IMdt>0; and M
￿
dt ￿ Mdt￿IMdt<0;
where IMdt>0 is an indicator function taking the value of 1 when Mdt>0, and 0 otherwise.
(IMdt<0 = 1 when Mdt < 0; and 0 otherwise). If credit is in fact allocated linearly according




dt would both be positive.
The second generalization is motivated by the discussion in section 2.3 and the results
in section 3.2: if politicians induce a lending boom in election years, then perhaps they
will di⁄erentially target credit in di⁄erent years of an election cycle. To allow for that, I









allowing a di⁄erent relationship between political support and credit for each year in the
election cycle.
This approach can perhaps be most easily understood by looking at Figure 1, which
graphs how levels of credit vary both across time and with the margin of victory, Mdt.
(The regression on which the graph is based is given below in equation 6). The top-
most graph gives the predicted relationship four years prior to the next scheduled election
(and therefore one year after the previous election): the slightly negative slope for posi-
tive margins of victory indicates that districts in which the average margin of victory is
greater than zero received slightly less credit. The slope of the lines are not statistically
distinguishable from zero.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
22The second panel in Figure 1, for the year three years prior to the next scheduled
election, continues to indicate a relatively ￿ at relationship: credit did not vary with
previous margin of victory. The same holds for two years before the election and one year
before the election. In a scheduled election year, however, there is a pronounced upside-
down V shape: the predicted amount of credit going to very close districts is substantially
greater than credit in districts that were not close.
The graph is based on the following regression:










































Standard errors are again clustered at the state-year level. Results are presented in the
third column of Table 7. Once the margin of victory is included, the estimated size of the
cycle increases, to approximately 10% at the minimum, three years prior to an election.
The relationships shown are statistically signi￿cant: the coe¢ cient on previous margin of




dt) are di⁄erent from zero at the 1% level. The
coe¢ cient on M
+
dt is approximately -0.34, while the coe¢ cient on M
￿
dt is 0.43. This implies
a substantial e⁄ect: the standard deviation of the margin of victory is approximately 15
percentage points: thus, a district in which the ruling party won (or lost) an election by
15 percentage points will receive approximately 5-6 percent less credit than a district in
which the previous election was narrowly won or lost.
The relationship between previous margin of victory and amount of credit in a year
k years before a scheduled election is given by the value of the parameters ￿+ + ￿
+
￿k: A






= 0, for k=-4, -3, -2, and -1 indicates that the slopes in
the o⁄-election years are not statistically indistinguishable from zero. The same holds for
tests of ￿￿ + ￿
￿
￿k, for k=-4, -3, -2, and -1 . Thus, targeting of credit towards marginal
districts appears in election years only. Nor is there any evidence of a patronage e⁄ect.
A patronage e⁄ect would show up if ￿￿ or ￿+; or the respective sums of main e⁄ect and
interaction (￿￿ + ￿
￿
￿k and ￿+ + ￿
+
￿k) were positive.
23The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms (￿
+
￿k compared to ￿
￿
k ) and the main e⁄ects
(￿+ compared to ￿￿) are roughly equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign. (Indeed the
test that ￿+ + ￿
+
￿k = ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿k cannot be rejected for any k) This suggests a useful
restriction. Recall that Mdt measures the average margin of victory in the district: while
results across constituencies within a district are highly correlated, Mdt does introduce
some measurement error. For example, the following two districts would have identical
values of Mdt: a district in which the margin of victory was 0 in every constituency; a
district in which the majority party won half the constituencies by a margin of 100%, and









where Mcdst is the margin of victory in constituency c in district d in state s in the most
recent election in year t, and Nd is the number of constituencies in a district. Estimating










for the interaction terms, resolves this measurement error problem. The estimated equa-
tion is thus:

















































Because electoral outcomes within a district are indeed correlated, the results are very
similar, and again suggest targeting in an election year, but no relationship in o⁄-years.
Figures 2 and 3 graph the information from the level and growth regressions of equation
6 in another way. They trace credit for both public and private sector banks, over the
election cycle. Figure 2 gives the relationship for a notional ￿swing￿district (Mdt = 0),
while Figure 3 gives the same relationship for a notional district whose margin of victory
was 15 percentage points in the previous election. Public sector grows sharply prior to an
election, increasing 10 percentage points between the year two years prior to the election
and election time. Predicted credit from private banks is ￿ at over the cycle.
24[FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The results reported here are robust to using year, rather than region-year, ￿xed
e⁄ects, as well as to restricting the sample to the major states of India. I estimated
quadratic speci￿cations, but found no strong evidence of non-linearities. A ￿nal robustness
check involves calculating the share of constituencies in a district in which the incumbent
enjoys a positive margin of victory (Fp), and computing the average of these positive
margins of victory M
+
d , and de￿ning the positive margin of victory f M
+
d =Fp ￿ M
+
d , and
the negative margin of victory f M
￿
d , analogously, and estimating equation 6 using these
measures. This measure would be more appropriate if political parties can target lending
resources to speci￿c constituencies.22 I ￿nd similar results, though less precisely estimated.




dt provide better ￿ts may suggest that district-level targeting
is the ￿ best￿that the political parties can do. Credit allocation at the district level may
shed additional light on this, but are unfortunately not available.
The time-series and cross-sectional evidence of manipulation of public resources sup-
ports the idea that credit is used by politicians to maximize electoral gains, rather than
reward core supporters. Are the credit booms around elections simply bad loans to friends
of politicians that will not be repaid, or is it only when the threat of a re-election looms
that politicians ensure that the banks are ful￿lling their legal obligation to provide credit
to the poorer sections of society? Even if the additional credit is ￿good￿credit, it is very
di¢ cult to imagine that the socially optimal allocation of agricultural credit is coincident
with the electoral cycle.
The cross-sectional data give support to an even stronger presumption that the ob-
served patterns are ine¢ cient. Surely districts whose population are strongly in favor (or
opposed to) the incumbent majority party do not need relatively less agricultural credit
in election years than districts that are more evenly split. Even if the additional credit
generated by political competition is welfare-improving, it is not at all obvious why it
should be targeted towards districts with electorally even races.
22I thank the editor for this suggestion.
253.3.1 Targeted Loan Enforcement and Forgiveness
Results in section 3.2.3 suggest that loan enforcement and forgiveness may also have a
political component. A nearly ideal mechanism allowing a politician to buy votes would
be to induce a bank to lend to individuals, promising to forgive loans if she or he wins the
election. In this section, I examine whether loan enforcement and forgiveness is targeted
towards speci￿c constituencies.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
Equation 6 can be used to relate the volume and share of agricultural credit marked
late to electoral competitiveness. In Table 8, I estimate this equation for two dependent
variables: total amount of credit marked late, and share of credit marked late. The
former serves as a proxy for loan forgiveness, as the amount of credit marked does not
depend materially on fresh loans, but rather on the disposition of late loans. There is
some evidence of targeted forgiveness: following election years, the amount of agricultural
credit drops precipitously in districts in which the winning party secured a majority. The
coe¢ cient on positive margin * (four years before an election) is negative and statistically
signi￿cant at the 1% level, while the interaction positive margin * (three years before
an election) is negative (but smaller). Immediately following an election, a district with
a margin of victory of 15 percentage points experiences approximately a 27 percentage
point decrease in agricultural credit marked as late, suggesting substantial write-o⁄s. In
contrast, there is no evidence that late credit in districts in which the ruling party lost
experience write-o⁄s following the election. Column (2) presents results for private banks;
there is no evidence of systematic targeting.
Column (3) examines the share of credit marked in default, for public banks: in an
election year, close districts experience a lower share than non-competitive districts. While
this may be at least partially driven by the aggregate increase in lending in close districts,
the size of the drop is too large to be explained by this alone. Rather, loan write-o⁄s
(or greater repayment) must occur. In the year following an election, districts with large
margins of victory experience signi￿cant drops in the share of lending, while those with
26negative margins of victory for the majority party do not. In other election years, there
is no statistical relationship between the share of credit in default and lending behavior.
The results in this section suggest that politicians reward their supporters immediately
following elections, by causing banks to write o⁄ loans to borrowers in constituencies
in which politicians enjoyed the greatest support. These patterns stand in contrast to
those for lending, where only marginal districts were rewarded. It may well be that
the politicians o⁄er di⁄erential inducement before and following the election. Before the
election, loans may win votes. Following the elections, politicians focus rewards on their
supporters.
4 Is Redistribution Costly?
4.1 Lending Booms and Agricultural Output
Perhaps the best way to evaluate the cost of cycles is to measure whether the loans
are put to productive use. That is, does credit a⁄ect agricultural output? This question
cannot be answered by measuring correlations between credit and agricultural output:
omitted factors, such as agricultural productivity, crop prices or idiosyncratic shocks will
almost surely bias any estimate. The lending booms documented in Section 3.2 suggest
an instrument for the e¢ cacy of politically-induced lending: the electoral cycle induces a
supply shock uncorrelated with other confounding factors.23
Most agricultural loans are short-term credit, for the purchase of inputs such as fer-
tilizer and seed. If additional credit leads to a more e¢ cient use of inputs, and increases
output, then the costs of political interference may be limited to sub-optimal allocation
of credit to farmers. On the other hand, if the additional credit has no e⁄ect on agricul-
tural output, this suggests that either the loans are used for very ine¢ cient investment in
agriculture, or they are simply consumed by the borrowing population.
23The observation that politicians hire additional police prior to elections is used by Levitt (1997) to
measure the e⁄ect of the size of the police force on crime.
27To answer this question, I use data on agricultural output (revenue and yield) at the
district level. The data set was initially assembled by Dinar et al (1998) for the time
period 1957-1987. It has been supplemented by Rohini Pande. I use two measures of
agricultural output. The ￿rst is log aggregate agricultural revenue, at the district level.
One di¢ culty with the data is that missing observations are relatively common. Thus, it is
not possible to calculate logrevenuedt=log
￿P
i2Crops pi;dt ￿ qi;dt
￿
for all districts. It would
not be correct to replace missing quantities with zero, as that would induce substantial,
potentially non-random variation in measured revenue. I therefore calculate revenue, using
for each district only the set of crops for which there are no missing values from 1992 to
1999. To measure yield, I take the average yield of all crops (yc;dt) in a district, weighted by
acres planted, acdt: Thus, yielddt = 1 P
i2crops ac;dt
P
i2Crops ￿c;dt￿yc;dt: Because the frequency
of missing data is relatively high (some states have output for only one or two years), the
size of the sample shrinks considerably, to 106 districts, over 8 years, located in only six
states.24 Because the number of states is low, I use year, rather than region-year, ￿xed
e⁄ects, when estimating equation 7.
Panel A of Table 9 presents the reduced form relationships between credit, output, and
the electoral cycle. The coe¢ cients on ￿
A
￿k are included in the regressions but suppressed
from the table for notational simplicity. As in the full sample, the electoral cycle dummies
and margin of victory variables serve as powerful predictors of agricultural credit. The
￿rst line of Panel A gives the results for public banks only. However, since I am unable to
determine which agricultural output is ￿nanced by public vs. private banks, the relevant
variable of interest for the structural equation is aggregate agricultural credit. The second
row of Panel A gives the relationship, and again electoral variables predict credit. The null
hypothesis that the electoral coe¢ cients ￿, ￿ and ￿ do not a⁄ect credit can be rejected
at less than 0.1% level.
The next two rows give the reduced form relationship between agricultural revenue,
24The states, are, however, among the most important in India: Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Andhra Pradesh, Madyha Pradesh, and Karntaka.
28and output, and the electoral cycle. While ￿￿1, the dummy on S
￿1
dt is negative and
signi￿cant for revenue, there is no systematic relationship between the electoral cycle
and revenue. The point estimates on ￿￿4 and ￿￿2 are positive, but statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. The reduced-form relationship for output is similar: only ￿
￿2 is
statistically signi￿cant from zero, and there is no pattern between credit and electoral
cycles.
In Panel B, I estimate the structural relationship between yield and credit, and output
and credit:
ydt = ￿i + ￿ ￿ creditdt + ￿t + "dt;
using the electoral variables as instruments for credit. The OLS relationship between
yield and output, and credit, is given in the ￿rst column of panel B.
For both measures of output, the point estimate of the e⁄ect of credit on output is
very close to zero. Unfortunately, the estimates are quite imprecise, with large standard
errors. Nevertheless, there is no systematic relationship between credit and output.
A previous version of this paper conducted the same exercise, using state-level data
on agricultural output. State-level agricultural data are available for 14 states. I found
that while credit varied with the electoral cycle, output did not. The IV estimates were
similarly imprecise.
Thus, while credit does go up in election years, there is no evidence that agricultural
output does so.
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusion
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that politicians will manipulate resources
under their control in order to achieve electoral success. Yet, compelling examples of this
manipulation are rarely documented in the literature. The ￿rst contribution of this paper
29is to develop an improved framework for testing for tactical redistribution. Combining
models of time-series manipulation with models of cross-sectional redistribution yields
predictions for the distribution of resources across time and space that are very unlikely
to be explained by omitted factors. These predictions are tested using data from agricul-
tural credit from public sector banks in India. I ￿nd evidence of political lending cycles.
Moreover, credit is targeted towards districts in which the majority party just won or just
lost the election. This targeting is observed only in election years. Finally, a separate
pattern of targeting is observed for loan write-o⁄s, than for lending: write-o⁄s are great-
est in the districts in which the winning party enjoyed the greatest electoral success; this
pattern is observed only following an election, not prior to it.
The second contribution of this paper is to measure the cost of these observed dis-
tortions. A loan-level analysis demonstrates that election cycles induced credit booms in
agricultural credit in election years. However, these booms induced substantially higher
default rates. Electoral cycles serve as an instrument for identifying the e⁄ect of mar-
ginal loans on output, providing evidence that increased levels of credit from public sector
banks do not a⁄ect aggregate agricultural output at the state level.
The third contribution of this paper is to provide a better understanding of why gov-
ernment ownership of banks has negative e⁄ects on real economic outcomes. Arguments
against government ownership of banks typically rest on two premises: government en-
terprises are less e¢ cient, and their resources are misused by politicians. This paper
provides a clear example of the latter, and suggests that the costs of misuse are so great
that additional government credit may have no e⁄ect on output. This is a particularly
important policy question, since government ownership of banks is very prevalent in de-
veloping countries, and ￿nancial development may be a key determinant of economic
growth.
It is worth noting that these results are not inconsistent with the ￿nding of Burgess and
Pande (2005) that rural banks reduce poverty. Their results suggest that the presence of
any bank in a village will reduce poverty, but they do not distinguish between public and
30private sector banks. Of particular relevance to their ￿ndings is the result in this paper
that government banks su⁄er substantially higher default rates. Burgess and Pande are
agnostic on whether the bene￿ts of rural branch expansion outweighed the cost, precisely
because the rural default rates were so high.
This paper also helps interpret tests for redistribution. Previous empirical work has
ignored the time series dimension, and may not provide an accurate picture, since redistri-
bution may only occur in periods just before an election. Second, the ￿nding of targeting
towards ￿swing districts￿suggests why approaches using regression-discontinuity design
(e.g., Miguel and Zaidi (2003)) ￿nd no e⁄ect of politics on the allocation of goods. If
resources are targeted towards swing districts, there will be no discontinuity between a
constituency in which the ruling party just won the previous election or just lost it.
The ￿ndings reported here are important, in terms of understanding the costs of
redistribution. The magnitudes are considerable: the estimated e⁄ect of 5-10% higher
levels of credit in election years is substantially larger than the average annual growth
rate of credit. E⁄orts to isolate government banks from political pressure, as is done
with many central banks, may reduce these e⁄ects. Politicians appear to care more about
winning re-election than rewarding their supporters, and they do so by targeting ￿swing￿
districts.
316 Data Appendix
The unit of observation throughout the study varies. Section 3 uses credit and political
data at the district level. The most comprehensive sample includes data from 412 districts,
located in 19 states, over the period 1992-1999. Private sector banks do not operate
in all districts in India, thus regressions involving private sector banks may have fewer
observations.
Credit data come from several sources. Agricultural credit and total credit for
the period 1992-1999 are from the Reserve Bank of India￿ s ￿Basic Statistical Returns-
1,￿published in ￿Banking Statistics.￿ These numbers are also aggregated to form the
state level agricultural data used in section 4.1. Aggregated data used for estimates of
deposit and credit growth over the period 1981-2000 are from the Reserve Bank of India,
￿Quarterly Handout: Basic Statistical Returns-7.￿
Rainfall data are from ￿Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: Monthly
and Annual Time Series (1950-99),￿ collected by Cort Willmott and Kenji Matsuura,
University of Delaware Center for Climatic Research. The data were matched to the
centroid of each Indian district using GIS software.
Elections Data are from the Election Commission of India publications. Data for
elections in 22 states, between 1985 and 1999. Constituencies were matched to districts
using information from the Indian Elections Commission, ￿Delimitation of parliamentary
and assembly constituencies order, 1976.￿Coalitions data, where necessary, were collected
from online searches of the Lexis-Nexis database.
Bank Branch Data are from the Reserve Bank of India, Directory of Commercial
Bank O¢ ces in India 1800-2000 (Volume 1), Mumbai. These data include the opening
(and closing) date of every bank branch in India, as well as the address of the branch.
Output Data Data on district-level agricultural outcomes are from Ariel Dinar et
al.(1998), including updates by Rohini Pande.
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36Panel A: Summary Statistics for Lending Cycle Regressions (19 states)
Mean Std. Dev N
Credit Variables
 Log Real Credit, All Banks 14.369 1.472 3296
 Log Real Credit, Public Banks 14.181 1.481 3296
 Log Real Credit, Private Banks 11.868 1.857 1761
.. .
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, All Banks 12.992 1.350 3296
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, Public Banks 12.751 1.379 3296
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, Private Banks 9.306 2.507 1640
Political Variables
Election Year 0.207 0.405 3296
Scheduled Election in 4 Years 0.229 0.420 3296
Scheduled Election in 3 Years 0.251 0.433 3296
Scheduled Election in 2 Years 0.248 0.432 3296
Scheduled Election in 1 Years 0.152 0.359 3296
Scheduled Election Year 0.121 0.327 3296
District Characteristics
Share of Agricultural Loans Late 0.133 0.104 3296
Share of All Loans Late 0.133 0.072 3296
Percent of Population Rural 0.785 0.149 3296
Share Literate 0.413 0.132 3296
Share Primary Graduates or Above 0.305 0.114 3296
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Targeted Redistribution Regressions (19 states)
Credit Variables
 Log Real Credit, All Banks 14.293 1.536 3408
 Log Real Credit, Public Banks 14.111 1.537 3408
 Log Real Credit, Private Banks 11.874 1.851 1777
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, All Banks 12.900 1.434 3408
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, Public Banks 12.666 1.450 3408
 Log Real Agricultural Credit, Private Banks 9.273 2.518 1656
Political Variables
Election Year 0.206 0.405 3408
Scheduled Election in 4 Years 0.225 0.418 3408
Scheduled Election in 3 Years 0.249 0.432 3408
Scheduled Election in 2 Years 0.248 0.432 3408
Scheduled Election in 1 Years 0.155 0.362 3408
Scheduled Election Year 0.123 0.329 3408
Margin of Victory of Ruling Party -0.001 0.167 2730
Absolute Value of Margin of Vicotry 0.195 0.114 2730
Scheduled Election in k years is a dummy indicating whether the next scheduled election will occur in k years. 
Notes: The unit of observation is the district-year. The sample used to estimate political cycles only (Tables 4-5) 
contains data from 412 districts in 19 states, over the period 1992-1999, for a total of 3296 observations. Political 
data were not available for all districts, so the analysis which includes "Margin of Victory" contains data from 348 
districts in 19 states, over the period 1992-1999.
The credit variables are the log value of the amount of credit issued by the specified group of banks (all credit, 
public credit only, or private credit.) Private banks are not present in all districts: thus, the number of observations 
is lower.
Margin of Victory is defined as the average share by which the majority party in the state won the district in the 
previous election. If there was no majority, then all parties in the ruling coalition are coded as "majority" party. 
Margin ranges from -1 to 1.Panel A: OLS All Bank Credit Public Bank Credit Private Bank Credit
Total Credit 0.019 0.015 0.034
(0.012) (0.013) (0.082)
Agricultural Credit 0.044 *** 0.047 *** -0.127
(0.017) (0.016) (0.139)
Non-Agricultural Credit 0.012 0.007 0.053
(0.014) (0.015) (0.080)
Panel B: Reduced Form
Total Credit 0.029 ** 0.031 ** 0.040
(0.013) (0.013) (0.053)
Agricultural Credit 0.046 *** 0.060 *** -0.021
(0.017) (0.019) (0.087)
Non-Agricultural Credit 0.021 0.020 0.061
(0.015) (0.014) (0.055)
Panel C: Instrumental Variables
Total Credit 0.028 ** 0.031 ** 0.039
(0.013) (0.014) (0.055)
Agricultural Credit 0.046 *** 0.060 *** -0.020
(0.018) (0.020) (0.092)
Non-Agricultural Credit 0.021 0.020 0.060
(0.016) (0.015) (0.058)
Panel D: Alternative IV Strategy
Total Credit 0.008 0.012 0.044
Table 2: The Effect of Elections on Credit
Total Credit 0.008 0.012 0.044
(0.013) (0.014) (0.029)
Agricultural Credit 0.028 ** 0.040 *** -0.065
(0.011) (0.013) (0.053)
Non-Agricultural Credit 0.002 0.003 0.063
(0.015) (0.016) (0.033)
N 3296 3296 1640
States 19 19 19
and S
0
st is a dummy variable indicating that five years prior to that year, there was an election. The coefficient on S
0
st is 0.99, 
with standard error of .01. The R
2 is .86.
Notes: Each cell represents a regression. The coefficient reported is a dummy for election year (Panel A), scheduled election 
year (Panel B), and election year instrumented with scheduled election year (Panel C.) The dependent variable is annual 
change in log real levels of credit. In addition to the indicated dependent variable of interest, all regressions include district and 
region-year fixed effects, and a measure of annual rainfall.
The unit of observation is district-year. There are data for 348 districts from 1992-1999, though private banks do not operate in 
all districts. Standard errors are clustered by state-year.
The first stage of the IV regression in Panel C is:  Esdt  d  rt  Raindst  0Sst
0  dstFour Three Two One
All Credit -0.033 ** -0.029 ** -0.035 ** -0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Agriculture -0.023 -0.045 ** -0.061 *** -0.022
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
Non-Agricultural Credit -0.029 * -0.024 -0.026 * 0.004
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Panel B: Public Banks
All Credit -0.033 ** -0.030 ** -0.040 *** -0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Agriculture -0.032 -0.056 ** -0.081 *** -0.034
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
Non-Agricultural Credit -0.026 -0.022 -0.028 * 0.004
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
All Credit 0.022 -0.033 -0.027 -0.156 *
(0.097) (0.088) (0.058) (0.089)
Panel C: Private Banks
Table 3: Lending Cycles By Industry and Bank Ownership
Years Until Next Scheduled Election
Panel A: All Banks
() () () ()
Agriculture 0.079 0.035 0.014 -0.003
(0.141) (0.121) (0.093) (0.156)
Non-Agricultural Credit -0.001 -0.058 -0.045 -0.173 *
(0.098) (0.090) (0.059) (0.090)
Standard errors are clustered by state-year.
Notes: Each row represents a regression. The coefficients reported are dummies for the number 
of years until the next scheduled election. The dependent variable is log credit. All regressions 
include district and region-year fixed effects, as well as annual rainfall.Four Three Two One
Panel A: All Banks
Log (Avg. Agricultural  Loan Size) -0.028 -0.011 -0.023 -0.058 **
(0.034) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028)
Log(Number of Ag. Loans) 0.005 -0.034 -0.038 0.036
(0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029)
Interest Rate-Agricultural 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: Public Banks
Log (Avg. Agricultural  Loan Size) -0.030 -0.013 -0.027 -0.055 *
(0.037) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029)
Log(Number of Ag. Loans) -0.003 -0.042 * -0.053 * 0.021
(0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.026)
Interest Rate-Agricultural 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel C: Private Banks
Log (Avg. Agricultural  Loan Size) 0.129 -0.001 0.034 0.070
(0.139) (0.134) (0.098) (0.158)
Log(Number of Ag. Loans) -0.050 0.037 -0.020 -0.073
(0.094) (0.091) (0.052) (0.091)
Table 4: Loan Characteristics Over the Election Cycle
Years Until Next Scheduled Election
() () () ()
Interest Rate-Agricultural 0.004 * 0.003 ** 0.005 *** 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Notes: Each row represents a regression. The coefficients reported are dummies for the number of years 
until the next scheduled election. The dependent variable is log credit. All regressions include district and 
region-year fixed effects, as well as annual rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the state year level.Four Three Two One
Volume of Late Agricultural Loans -0.063 -0.099 -0.150 ** -0.127
(0.087) (0.067) (0.067) (0.098)
Share of Agricultural Loans Late -0.034 *** -0.026 ** -0.017 -0.022 *
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Share of Agricultural Credit Late -0.022 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Volume of Late Agricultural Loans -0.074 -0.102 -0.162 ** -0.134
(0.089) (0.074) (0.072) (0.105)
Share of Agricultural Loans Late -0.035 *** -0.027 *** -0.019 * -0.017
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Share of Agricultural Credit Late -0.025 ** -0.011 -0.008 -0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Volume of Late Agricultural Loans 0.030 0.201 ** -0.102 0.038
(0.187) (0.094) (0.203) (0.170)
Share of Agricultural Loans Late -0.015 -0.014 -0.021 -0.040 **
(0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Share of Agricultural Credit Late -0.002 0.003 0.008 -0.025
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
Table 5: Lending Cycles and Non-Performing Loans
Panel B: Public Banks
Panel C: Private Banks
Years Until Next Scheduled Election
Panel A: All Banks
() () () ()
Notes: Each row represents a single regression. The unit of observation is a district-year. The independent variables of 
interest are a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years until the next scheduled election. Panels A and B 
contain data from 412 districts. Panel C contains data from 180 districts. Public Banks Private Banks
Interaction Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Interaction 0.04 ** -0.04
(0.02) (0.08)
Quality of Intermediation
Share of Agricultural Loans Late in 1992 0.05 ** -0.08 0.04 -0.62
(0.02) (0.08) (0.11) (0.90)
Share of All Loans Late in 1992 0.06 ** -0.08 -0.09 0.40
(0.03) (0.15) (0.15) (1.23)
Population Characteristics
Percent of Population Rural, 1991 -0.05 0.12 ** 0.02 -0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.29) (0.35)
Share Literate, 1991 0.18 *** -0.30 *** -0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.11) (0.22) (0.40)
Share Primary Graduates or Above, 1991 0.15 *** -0.32 ** -0.02 -0.07
(0.05) (0.13) (0.18) (0.41)
Table 6: District Characteristics and Cycles in Agricultural Credit
Scheduled 
Election
Notes: Each row of this table presents two regressions. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions for public banks, 
while columns (3) and (4) present regressions for private banks. The dependent variable is log agricultural credit, at 
the district level. All regressions include district and region-year fixed effects, as well as annual rainfall. Standard 
Scheduled 
Election
The regressions using lending from public banks have 3408 observations, from 426 districts in 22 states over eight 
years.
gg y
errors are clustered at the state year level.Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cycle Dummies: 
Number of Years Until Next Election Baseline With Margin
Four -0.02 -0.04 * -0.07 *** -0.13 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Three -0.04 * -0.07 *** -0.10 *** -0.17 ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Two -0.07 *** -0.06 *** -0.10 *** -0.14 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
One -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 ** -0.10 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Margin of Victory -0.051
(0.032)
Abs (Margin of Victory) -0.51 ***
(0.10)
Positive Margin of Victory -0.340 ***
(0.083)
Negative Margin of Victory 0.428 ***
(0.104)
Positive Margin * Cycle Dummy
Positive Margin *  0.153
   Four Years until Election (0.103)
Positive Margin *  0.143
   Three Years until Election (0.153)





Table 7: Targeted Levels of Credit Over Time and Across Districts, Public Banks
Abs( Margin) and 
Abs(Interactions)
g
   Two Years until Election (0.106)
Positive Margin *  0.245 **
   One Year until Election (0.097)
Negative Margin * Cycle Dummy
Negative Margin *  -0.340 ***
   Four Years until Election (0.123)
Negative Margin *  -0.289 **
   Three Years until Election (0.134)
Negative Margin *  -0.365 ***
   Two Years until Election (0.124)
Negative Margin *  -0.421 ***
   One Year until Election (0.146)
Absolute Margin * Cycle Dummy
Absolute(Margin) *  0.41 ***
   Four Years until Election (0.13)
Absolute(Margin) *  0.50 ***
   Three Years until Election (0.14)
Absolute(Margin) *  0.36 ***
   Two Years until Election (0.14)
Absolute(Margin) *  0.35 **
   One Year until Election (0.14)
R^2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
N 3408 2730 2730 2730
Number of states 19 19 19 ** 19
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Log agricultural credit is the dependent variable. Panel A gives the results for 
public sector banks. Panel B gives the results for private sector banks. The independent variables of interest are a set of dummy 
variables indicating the number of years until the next scheduled election, and the average margin by which candidates from the party 
(or coalition) currently in power in the state won (or lost) in the specific district. Each regression also includes district and region-year 
fixed effects, and average annual rainfall in the district. Standard errors are clustered by state-year.Panel B: Private Banks (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cycle Dummies: 
Number of Years Until Next Election Baseline With Margin
Four 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.35
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.24)
Three 0.04 -0.04 0.10 -0.20
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
Two 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.29
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.21)
One -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 -0.44
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.31)
Margin of Victory 0.634 ***
(0.236)
Abs(Margin of Victory) -0.65
(0.78)
Positive Margin of Victory 0.590
(0.582)
Negative Margin of Victory -0.464
(0.761)
Positive Margin * Cycle Dummy
Positive Margin *  1.353
   Four Years until Election (0.912)
Positive Margin *  -1.462





Table 7 (continued): Targeted Levels of Credit Over Time and Across Districts, Private Banks
Abs( Margin) and 
Abs(Interactions)
()
Positive Margin *  0.909
   Two Years until Election (0.833)
Positive Margin *  1.196
   One Year until Election (1.008)
Negative Margin * Cycle Dummy
Positive Margin *  0.620
   Four Years until Election (0.789)
Margin *  1.250
   Three Years until Election (0.986)
Margin *  0.619
   Two Years until Election (0.863)
Margin *  0.435
   One Year until Election (0.942)
Absolute Margin * Cycle Dummy
Absolute(Margin) *  1.58 *
   Four Years until Election (0.82)
Absolute(Margin) *  0.57
   Three Years until Election (1.08)
Absolute(Margin) *  1.49 *
   Two Years until Election (0.84)
Absolute(Margin) *  1.40
   One Year until Election (0.99)
R^2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
N 1656 1393 1393 1393
Number of states 19 19 19 19
Notes: See Panel A for notes.Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cycle Dummies: 
Number of Years Until Next Election Public Banks Private Banks Public Banks Private Banks
Four -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.02
(0.11) (0.24) (0.01) (0.03)
Three -0.07 0.32 * 0.00 0.01
(0.10) (0.19) (0.01) (0.02)
Two -0.12 0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.26) (0.01) (0.03)
One -0.26 * 0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.14) (0.23) (0.02) (0.03)
Margin of Victory
Abs (Margin of Victory)
Positive Margin of Victory 0.183 0.878 0.134 ** -0.078
(0.328) (1.545) (0.061) (0.170)
Negative Margin of Victory -0.075 -1.178 -0.129 ** 0.095
(0.364) (0.774) (0.063) (0.130)
Positive Margin * Cycle Dummy
Positive Margin *  -1.839 *** 0.783 -0.236 ** 0.144
   Four Years until Election (0.629) (1.698) (0.100) (0.226)
Positive Margin *  -0.927 ** -0.096 -0.085 -0.001
   Three Years until Election (0.451) (1.822) (0.079) (0.186)
Positive Margin *  -0.427 -1.380 -0.098 -0.384
   Two Years until Election (0.348) (1.726) (0.069) (0.316)
Positive Margin * 0 604 1 534 -0 063 -0 175
Table 8: Targeted Levels of Credit Default Over Time and Across Districts
Volume of Late Agricultural Credit Share of Late Agricultural Credit
Positive Margin *  0.604 1.534 -0.063 -0.175
   One Year until Election (0.407) (1.732) (0.080) (0.244)
Negative Margin * Cycle Dummy
Negative Margin *  0.712 -0.050 0.087 -0.217
   Four Years until Election (0.584) (1.036) (0.084) (0.146)
Negative Margin *  0.440 1.058 0.118 -0.019
   Three Years until Election (0.455) (0.906) (0.079) (0.135)
Negative Margin *  -0.472 0.252 0.051 -0.070
   Two Years until Election (0.540) (1.030) (0.077) (0.174)
Negative Margin *  -0.995 * 0.349 0.110 0.017
   One Year until Election (0.590) (0.896) (0.086) (0.147)
R^2 0.92 0.83 0.59 0.64
N 2654 1026 2717 1253
Number of states 19 19 19 19
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is volume of delinquent 
agricultural credit; in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is share of agricultural credit that is delinquent. The independent 
variables of interest are a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years until the next scheduled election, and the average 
margin by which candidates from the party (or coalition) currently in power in the state won (or lost) in the specific district. Each 
regression also includes district and region-year fixed effects, and average annual rainfall in the district. Standard errors are 
clustered by state-year.Four Three Two One
Panel A: Reduced Form
Agricultural Credit, Government Ban -0.154 ** -0.179 *** -0.176 *** -0.073
(0.069) (0.064) (0.060) (0.048)
Agricultural Credit, All Banks -0.120 * -0.138 ** -0.159 *** -0.067
(0.068) (0.063) (0.054) (0.045)
Revenue 0.026 -0.208 0.014 -0.483 ***
(0.112) (0.159) (0.146) (0.146)
Output (Index) 0.058 -0.217 ** 0.030 -0.152
(0.085) (0.101) (0.091) (0.113)
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Credit




Table 9: Lending, Agircultural Investment and Output
Years Until Next Scheduled Election
Notes: Each row represents a single regression. Data are available for 106 districts, located within 6 states, 
for the period 1992-1999. The dependent variables of interest are dummy variables indicating the number of 
years until the next scheduled election. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
(0.047) (0.409)
Notes: Each cell represents a single regression. Data are available for 106 districts, located within 6 states, 
for the period 1992-1999. The dependent variables of interest are revenue (column 1) and output (column 
2). The OLS relationship is given in the first row. An instrumental variables estimate is given in the second 
row. Four dummies for the election schedule, along with the absolute value of the margin of victory enjoyed 
by the ruling party (interacted with each election cycle dummy) serve as instruments. The null hypothesis 
that the instruments do not predict aggregate credit can be rejected at the 0.1% level. All regressions include 






























































































































Note: The panels in the figure graph the predicted relationship between agricultural credit levels from
public sector banks and political support of the state majority party. Each panel gives the 
relationship for a different year in the electoral cycle.
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Note: Predicted agricultural credit for a notional district in which the margin of victory in the
previous election was zero. Dotted lines give the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Years Until Scheduled Election
Private Banks
Note: Predicted agricultural credit for a notional district in which the margin of victory in the
previous election was fifteen. Dotted lines give the 95 percent confidence interval.
Figure 3: Cycles in Level of Credit, Non-Swing District